



ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
BERTRALL L. ROSS II† 
ABSTRACT 
In the debate about who controls the meaning of the Constitution, popular 
constitutionalism appears to be losing. Popular constitutionalist methods for popular 
input into the evolving meaning of the Constitution account for a diminishing fraction 
of changes to constitutional meaning over time. Social movements remain rare, 
Congress is increasingly dysfunctional, and recent presidential proclamations and 
executive orders have not engaged constitutionalism with the degree of specificity 
necessary to influence the meaning of the Constitution. Focusing on these traditional 
methods, it appears that judicial supremacy has won and that courts exercise near-
exclusive control over the meaning of the Constitution. 
In this Article, I argue that such appearances are deceiving. As the debate between 
popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy faded from legal scholarship a 
decade ago, new descriptive and normative accounts of agencies as actors involved 
in determining the meaning of the Constitution have emerged. Administrative 
agencies, through their statutory implementation and enforcement roles, are involved 
in the application of constitutional principles embedded in statutes. While agencies 
lack the popular pedigree of Congress and the President, these implementation and 
enforcement decisions often involve the people either formally through notice-and-
comment rulemaking or informally through interest group and social movement 
engagement. Although not labeled “popular constitutionalism,” these forms of popular 
engagement with agencies that have been richly explored in the historical and 
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normative accounts of administrative constitutionalism should be understood as forms 
of popular constitutionalism. 
Beyond connecting administrative constitutionalism to popular constitutionalism, 
this Article will identify another means by which agencies through their actions 
involve the people in constitutional meaning determinations. This account requires a 
shift in focus from the popular inputs into administrative constitutionalism to the 
outputs from administrative constitutionalism. I show through the example of recent 
administrative actions enforcing the Fair Housing Act how administrative actions 
serve as catalysts for popular debate about the constitutional principles embedded in 
statutes and the means by which these constitutional principles should be applied. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade ago, Larry Kramer, one of the leading advocates of popular 
constitutionalism, issued a scholarly call to arms in the fight against judicial 
supremacy. Lamenting judicial assertions of control over the meaning of the 
Constitution, Kramer implored scholars to explore institutional alternatives 
that provide for greater popular input into constitutional meaning 
determinations. He asserted that we should no longer accept the notion that 
“popular constitutionalism can’t work, so turn the Constitution over to the 
Court.”1 Instead, “[w]e should . . . be asking what kind of institutions we can 
construct to make popular constitutionalism work, because we need new ones. 
We need to start rethinking and building institutions that can make 
democratic constitutionalism possible. And we need to start doing so now.”2 
 
1 Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006) [hereinafter Kramer, Response]. 
2 Id. 
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Despite this call, popular constitutionalism remains a theory in search of 
a workable method.3 The theory of popular constitutionalism is rather clear: 
the people should have the final say in determining the meaning of the 
Constitution.4 It counters the notion that the Court is the supreme authority 
over constitutional meaning—which is the approach preferred by the 
Supreme Court and many constitutional scholars.5 Judicial supremacy, the 
popular constitutionalists argue, is contrary to the Framers’ intent, historical 
constitutional practice, and our democratic system of government.6 
While clear at the level of theory, the suggested methods for 
implementing popular constitutionalism remain vague and underdeveloped. 
Popular constitutionalists agree that the formal process for amending the 
Constitution under Article V is an inadequate channel for popular input into 
constitutional meaning.7 The barriers to passing an amendment through this 
formal channel are too high, resulting in amendments that are too few and 
far between to keep up with evolving societal values.8 
 
3 See, e.g., Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 166 (2012) 
(describing critics’ fears that the institutional solutions that prominent popular constitutionalists 
suggest to implement popular constitutionalism “are too radical” because they would “undermine 
judicial authority and result in majoritarian tyranny”); Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and 
Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 340 (2008) (“[P]opular 
constitutionalists have not yet specified the precise means by which the American people are to provide 
their answers to the nation’s reasonably contested constitutional questions.”). 
4 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and 
the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2007) (explaining that the theory 
of popular constitutionalism “does not assume that authoritative legal interpretation can take place 
only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally valid process of interpretation can be undertaken 
in the political branches and by the community at large”). 
5 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“The design of the Amendment 
and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the 
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 
18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”); Larry 
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 
1359 (1997) (offering a critique of constitutionalism outside of the courts and a defense of judicial 
supremacy); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 6 (2001) (describing the 
widespread approval of “the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the Constitution for everyone”). 
6 See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 128-44 (2005) (discussing the history of opposition to judicial authority by 
Republicans in the early decades of the republic). 
7 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 380 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage] (“Article V 
amendments are so very rare that they cannot provide an effective avenue for connecting 
constitutional law to popular commitments.”). 
8 This is reflected in the fact that only seventeen amendments have been ratified in the 225 years 
since the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Most of these amendments are in the category of procedural 
amendments rather than amendments that represent the evolving constitutional values of the people. 
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From this point of agreement, popular constitutionalists diverge. One 
variant of popular constitutionalism argues for a direct form of popular input 
into constitutional meaning determinations similar to that demanded by the 
Article V amendment process but without the same high procedural barriers.9 
Central to this account are mass social movements that engage in dialogue 
with counter-movements and the courts to influence the meaning of the 
Constitution. The prime example of such direct popular constitutionalism is 
the second feminist movement of the 1970s.10 Although the movement failed 
in its effort to pass the Equal Rights Amendment to protect the equality of 
the sexes, it did succeed through its dialogue with counter-movements and 
the courts in changing judicial doctrine to incorporate gender equality 
principles into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.11 
Other twentieth-century examples of direct popular constitutionalism 
include: (1) the civil rights movement, which inspired a broader principle of 
racial equality more protective of African Americans and a statutory regime 
focused on prohibiting racial discrimination;12 (2) the gun rights movement, 
which informed a constitutional principle protecting the individual right to 
bear arms;13 and (3) the gay rights movement, which influenced the 
 
9 See, e.g., 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 26-32 (2014) (arguing that constitutional 
changes through constitutional moments supplement the Article V constitutional amendment 
process); Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case 
of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 27 (2005) (contending that “Article III, not Article 
V, has been the great vehicle of constitutional development” with social movements profoundly 
shaping judicial interpretations of the Constitution); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-
Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 499 (2001) (describing how 
constitutional change occurs outside of the formal Article V amendment process through the 
enactment of super-statutes and “dynamic interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court” 
arising from the influence of identity-based social movements); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender 
and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (identifying a 
process of constitutional change outside the formal Article V amendment process that involves social 
movement mobilization, countermobilizations, and dialogue between the people and the courts). 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (2003) (noting that the Court’s “sex discrimination 
jurisprudence . . . was educated by the evolving constitutional beliefs and values of nonlegal actors, 
as manifested by congressional legislation”); Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 385 (“The 
contemporary constitutional law of sex discrimination . . . first appeared when the Court was able 
to perceive points of convergence in the nation’s understanding of women as equal citizens that 
emerged within debates between those who opposed and those who embraced the ERA.”); Reva B. 
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) (arguing that the “equal protection doctrine 
prohibiting sex discrimination was forged in the Equal Rights Amendment’s defeat”). 
12  See, e.g., CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT 39-114, 240-68 (2014) (describing the instrumental role of the civil rights movement 
in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
13  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191, 239-45 (2008) (describing the influence of a mobilized gun rights movement on 
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development of constitutional principles of sexual autonomy and anti-
discrimination against LGBT people.14 
Direct popular constitutionalism provides an important popular 
counterweight to judicial supremacy. But social movements that succeed in 
changing the Constitution are not that common. The scarcity of examples of 
direct popular constitutionalism relative to the aggregate number of changes in 
constitutional meaning that the Court makes suggests that the general pattern 
of judicial control over constitutional meaning remains mostly undisturbed. 
Another variant of popular constitutionalism identifies more indirect forms 
of popular constitutionalism mediated through elected and accountable 
institutional actors.15 For mediated popular constitutionalists, the primary focal 
points are Congress and the President.16 The political branches make 
constitutional meaning determinations through the enactment and 
enforcement of statutes, executive orders, presidential speeches, and 
 
the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller interpreting the Second Amendment to protect an 
individual right to bear arms). 
14 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2066 (2002) (describing how 
“[identity-based social movements] have moved public norms away from understanding race, sex, 
and sexual orientation as malign variations toward understanding them as tolerable and (for race and 
sex) benign variations” (emphasis in original)). 
15 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric 
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that Congress can assert its historic 
role in the creation of constitutional meaning during a time when the “[Supreme] Court employed 
doctrines of deference to vindicate democratic values in constitutional interpretation, defining the 
scope of federal power in terms that gave great weight to Congress’s judgments about the nation’s 
needs and interests”); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1837, 1837 (2009) (arguing that constitutional developments in recent decades “are episodes in 
presidential popular constitutionalism”); see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602 (2003) (describing how popular constitutionalism is mediated through 
the courts, which “play[] an important role in identifying those constitutional values that achieve 
widespread popular support over time”). 
16 See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1069, 1081 (2006) (drawing attention to a method of presidential constitutionalism 
through the use of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1338 (2001) (“Congress, not the Court, is often best 
situated to make the judgments necessary to create a Constitution of relevance to Americans today.”); 
Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2004) (“Because both the President and the Congress are agents of the 
people’s will, popular control of constitutional meaning demands that Congress and the President must 
be free to make and act on their own interpretations of the Constitution.”); Purdy, supra note 15, at 1844 
(describing presidential inaugural addresses as instruments of presidential constitutional 
interpretation); see also Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial 
Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 1005-06 (2010) (arguing for the placement of unreviewable 
constitutional interpretive authority in the federal trial courts); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as 
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2064-66 (2010) (arguing for elected state judiciaries 
as institutions capable of advancing popular constitutionalism). 
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presidential signing statements.17 Because Congress and the President are 
directly elected by the people, their decisions regarding constitutional meaning 
are considered a form of constitutionalism that is responsive to the values of 
the people.18 
Mediated forms of popular constitutionalism through Congress and the 
President account for a broader swath of constitutional meaning 
determinations than direct popular constitutionalism. But this more 
institutionalist account of popular constitutionalism leaves out an important 
vehicle for popular constitutional lawmaking that has been historically 
prominent and is even more important today: administrative agencies.19 
Understanding the role of administrative agencies in popular 
constitutionalism requires disaggregating constitutionalism, linking 
administrative actions to a form of constitutionalism, and then recognizing 
the multiple modes of administrative engagement with the public. 
Popular constitutionalists have glossed over a critical distinction between 
two aspects of constitutionalism—the distinction between constitutional 
principle elaboration and constitutional principle application. Direct and 
mediated forms of popular constitutionalism foreground the people and the 
people’s representatives in the elaboration of constitutional principles. Such 
principles include gender, racial, and sexual orientation equality; sexual and 
bodily autonomy; the individual right to bear arms; and the right to marry who 
one chooses. The articulation of these constitutional principles has captured the 
imagination of popular constitutionalists. But the level of generality at which 
these principles are elaborated means that intermediaries are needed to actually 
regulate conduct. These intermediaries come in the form of standards, rules, 
and other forms of constitutional principle applications. 
For example, the constitutional principle of gender equality requires a 
standard or rule to determine whether a state employer’s exclusion of women 
from pregnancy benefits or a state-law grant of hiring preferences for veterans 
over nonveterans (when most veterans are men) is inconsistent with the 
principle. Social movements, Congress, and the President are certainly 
involved in the development and enforcement of constitutional principle 
applications. But such applications typically lack the popular salience of 
 
17 Franklin, supra note 16, at 1069 (noting that “popular constitutionalism in 2006 may in 
practice mean presidential popular constitutionalism”); Purdy, supra note 15, at 1837 (noting “the role 
of the President as a popular constitutional interpreter, articulating and revising normative accounts 
of the nation that interact dynamically with citizens’ constitutional understandings”). 
18 See, e.g., Kramer, Response, supra note 1, at 1176-77. 
19 No popular constitutionalist scholar has specifically suggested that agencies as institutions 
are capable and situated to implement popular constitutionalism. For instance, Larry Kramer 
describes the disagreement about interpretive methods as “centered on which institution or 
institutions had power to interpret: Congress, the President, the courts, the states, or the community 
at large.” Larry Kramer, Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (2006). 
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constitutional principle elaboration and therefore do not motivate as much 
social movement activity. Similarly, Presidents, in their platforms and 
speeches, typically emphasize broader principles over narrower applications. 
Statutes and executive orders therefore serve as the primary means of 
congressional and presidential engagement with constitutional applications. 
During active periods of lawmaking that involve the enactment of broad 
statutes with direct constitutional implications, Congress, through its 
engagement with the people and dialogue with the courts, fills much of the 
gap in popular constitutional lawmaking. But such active periods of 
congressional lawmaking are rare. In fact, with the exception of two brief 
periods—post-9/11 and the first two years of the Obama presidency20—the 
new norm over the past twenty years is one of congressional dysfunction and 
gridlock in which even ordinary lawmaking is nearly impossible.21 Presidents 
have stepped into this breach using executive orders and presidential 
memoranda as lawmaking devices.22 But while there are high profile 
examples, such as President Obama’s memorandum establishing the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrival policy and President Trump’s executive order 
banning entry into the United States by individuals from mostly Muslim-
majority counties, executive orders and presidential memoranda rarely 
function as tools advancing constitutional principles and applications.23 
Contrary to the current popular constitutionalist account, Congress and the 
President are not always the primary institutional vehicles for popular 
engagement with the Constitution. Administrative agencies are critical 
components of the popular constitutionalist project. 
Congress often delegates to agencies the authority to enforce statutes 
advancing constitutional principles. In their role enforcing statutes 
implicating constitutional principles, agencies often engage in dialogue with 
the people and the courts in their development and enforcement of particular 
constitutional applications. My prior work on administrative constitutionalism 
emphasizes popular input into administrative actions through the notice-and-
 
20 See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 85, 94 (2015) 
(describing these two periods as historically strong periods of congressional lawmaking). 
21 See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006). 
22 See Jessica Stricklin, The Most Dangerous Directive: The Rise of the Presidential Memoranda in 
the Twenty-First Century as a Legislative Shortcut, 88 TUL. L. REV. 397, 410 (2013) (describing 
presidential memoranda and executive orders as “vehicles to enact significant policy change with the 
force and effect of law without any legislative interference”). 
23 See Jessica Arco, A DREAM Turned Nightmare: The Unintended Consequences of the Obama 
Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Policy, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 493, 507-10 
(2014) (describing the Obama’s administration deferred action for childhood arrival policy); see also 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,780, 
82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
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comment rulemaking procedure.24 But while this is an important aspect of 
popular engagement with administrative actions, it is neither sufficient nor 
necessary to satisfy the mandate of popular constitutionalism.25 
Public engagement with the Constitution requires a catalyst that 
nationalizes a debate about constitutional principles and their applications. 
Courageous human acts such as Rosa Parks’ decision to disobey a Jim Crow 
law and sit at the front of a Birmingham bus sparked a civil rights movement 
that ultimately triggered a national debate about the constitutional meaning 
of equal protection as applied to race.26 Books such as Betty Friedan’s The 
Feminine Mystique and the creation of the National Organization for Women 
inspired a second feminist movement focused on women’s liberation and a 
constitutional goal of gender equality.27 Events like the Black Panthers’ armed 
protest on the steps in the California capitol building and the assassinations 
of Dr. Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy inspired state and federal 
gun control measures, which in turn sparked a gun rights movement that 
advanced a libertarian interpretation of the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms.28 From a popular constitutionalist perspective, the importance of these 
movements was not simply in the constitutional results achieved, but in the 
process by which the broader public participated centrally in debates about 
the meaning of the Constitution. 
Congress and the President also serve as critical catalysts for national 
constitutional debates. For Congress, the spark is often the adoption of statutes 
that apply or implicate the Constitution. But it could also be a hearing that 
 
24 See Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 576 
(2015) (identifying the notice-and-comment rulemaking process as a tool by which agencies can 
obtain public input and “engage in a deliberative process of constitutionalism resistant to the 
demands of ordinary politics”). 
25 The notice-and-comment procedure is not sufficient because the public involved in the 
process usually comprises a narrow slice of interested and elite actors. See, e.g., Marissa Martino 
Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 245, 252-255 (1998) (finding interest group and other elite 
actor domination in the notice-and-comment process across environmental, transportation, and civil 
rights agencies). The notice-and-comment procedure is not necessary because other types of agency 
actions can involve the public in debates about the meaning of the Constitution. See infra Part IV. 
26 See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery 
Bus Boycott, 1955-1957, 9 L. & HIST. REV. 59, 59 (1991) (“Considerable attention has naturally 
focused on the Montgomery bus boycott that signaled the start of the modern civil rights movement 
in December, 1955, when Rosa Parks refused to go to the back of the bus.”). 
27 See Becky Thompson, Multiracial Feminism: Recasting the Chronology of Second Wave Feminism, 
28 FEMINIST STUD. 336, 338 (2002) (“Normative accounts of the Second Wave feminist movement 
often reach back to the publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique in 1963, the founding 
of the National Organization for Women in 1966, and the emergence of women’s consciousness-
raising (CR) groups in the late 1960s.”). 
28 See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 247-58 (2013) (tracing the inspirations for and enactment of gun control legislation in the 
1960s and the ensuing pushback from supporters of broader gun rights). 
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Congress holds on a constitutionally-related issue or a judicial confirmation 
process that raises constitutional issues that draw public attention. Presidents 
often inspire public debates about the Constitution through their campaigns 
for the office, through speeches once in office such as the inauguration speech 
or State of the Union speeches, and through executive actions such as executive 
orders that apply or implicate the Constitution. 
Finally, and most relevant here, administrative agencies also bring about 
popular constitutional debates through their actions. The impetus can come in 
the form of a rule adopted through notice-and-comment procedures. But more 
frequently, the catalyst arises from an agency’s decision to initiate or join a 
lawsuit, a congressional hearing involving agency heads, or agency heads’ direct 
engagement with the people through speeches or opinion editorials. 
In this Article, I describe an example of an administrative action setting 
off a national debate about the application of a constitutional principle: the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) decision to 
intervene in a lawsuit seeking enforcement of a desegregation mandate under 
the Fair Housing Act. This action triggered a public debate that played out 
in the media and in 2016 presidential campaign discussions about segregation 
and federal power that directly implicated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.29 
HUD’s action not only catalyzed national debates about critical 
constitutional issues, it also facilitated a dialogue between the people and the 
courts. This process points to a final important feature of popular 
constitutional theory. For most popular constitutional theorists, popular 
constitutionalism means more than a national debate on a constitutional 
issue. It also means communicating popular constitutional views to the actor 
usually responsible for making final determinations about the meaning of the 
Constitution—courts. Social movements, Congress, the President and 
agencies open the line of communications through actions that serve as  
catalysts for national constitutional debates. Courts can then act on what they 
learn through their judicial review of those very catalysts of national 
constitutional debate, such as statutes, executive orders, agency rules, and 
agency-involved lawsuits. 
In the rest of this Article, I develop the case for administrative 
constitutionalism as a form of popular constitutionalism. In Part I, I broadly 
outline the theory of popular constitutionalism and the different methods 
advanced thus far for public input into constitutional meaning 
determinations. In Part II, I identify an important oversight in popular 
constitutionalism: the failure to disaggregate constitutionalism. I separate 
constitutionalism into two parts—constitutional principle elaboration and 
 
29 See infra Part IV. 
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constitutional principle application—and provide examples of both. I show 
how constitutional applications play a central role in defining the meaning 
and scope of constitutional principles. 
In Part III, I show how agencies are involved in constitutionalism through 
their enforcement of statutes implicating or advancing constitutional 
principles. I then theorize about when and how administrative 
constitutionalism functions as a form of popular constitutionalism by 
triggering national constitutional debate and creating a communicative 
pathway between the people and the courts. I conclude Part III by arguing 
that administrative agencies are now a critical institutional vehicle for popular 
constitutionalism in the current context of legislative dysfunction. In Part IV, 
I present an example of administrative constitutionalism as popular 
constitutionalism: HUD’s actions to enforce the affirmatively further fair 
housing mandate under the Fair Housing Act. 
I. THEORIES OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Popular constitutionalism is a simple theory with a constellation of 
approaches that seek to operationalize it. According to the theory, the people 
should be involved in determining the meaning of the Constitution.30 
Implicit within this normative prescription is the view that the Constitution’s 
meaning is not fully determined by its text. Open-ended textual requirements 
for freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection combined with 
implicit principles of federalism and separation of powers require not only 
interpretation relying on textual tools, legislative history, and past public 
understandings of meaning, but also construction according to the evolving 
values of society.31 
The popular constitutionalist foil is judicial supremacy. According to the 
more extreme judicial supremacist account, courts should have the exclusive 
and final say over the meaning of the Constitution; the less extreme account 
suggests that courts should have the final say in that their judgments about the 
meaning of the Constitution are final.32 In the 1950s, the liberal Warren Court 
planted the seeds of judicial supremacy in its fight against massive resistance 
from state and local officials to the Court’s school desegregation mandate in 
 
30 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 961 
n.3 (2004) (“‘Popular constitutionalism’ refers to the idea that authority to interpret and enforce the 
Constitution is not deposited exclusively or ultimately in courts . . . but remains in politics and with 
‘the people themselves.’”). 
31 See Pettys, supra note 3, at 339 (“Because many of the Constitution’s provisions are open-
ended in their language, the Constitution’s meaning is often highly contested.”). 
32 See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 
1550 (2005) (describing two versions of judicial supremacy). 
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Brown v. Board of Education.33 The Court in Cooper v. Aaron explained that its 
constitutional determinations must prevail over those of the people’s 
representatives because Article III of the Constitution (as interpreted in 
Marbury v. Madison) gave the Court exclusive and final say over the 
document’s meaning.34 Another principle animating the liberal judicial 
supremacist argument was that the Court, as a counter-majoritarian 
institution, needed to have the exclusive and final say over the Constitution in 
order to protect the rights of minorities against the tyranny of the majority.35 
In the 1990s, the more conservative Rehnquist Court peeled judicial 
supremacy away from its liberal, rights-protective roots and advanced an 
institutional argument for exclusive and final authority over constitutional 
meaning that was based on separation of powers and federalism. The 
divergence from the liberal roots of judicial supremacy is perhaps best 
exemplified by the Rehnquist Court’s employment of the doctrine as a 
justification for striking down democratically enacted laws protective of 
minority rights.36 Separation of powers and federalism, according to the 
Court, prohibited the people’s representatives from protecting rights beyond 
those the Court already protected in its constitutional jurisprudence.37 
Both manifestations of judicial supremacy agree that the Constitution is not 
ordinary law whose meaning should be determined through simple majoritarian 
politics.38 Instead, the Constitution is considered higher law that requires 
 
33 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (remanding school segregation cases to district courts and 
instructing them to “enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and 
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the 
parties to these cases”). 
34 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
35 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and 
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 827-28 (2002) (“Judicial supremacy . . . is regarded ‘as a permanent 
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system’ because the Court alone functions as a 
countermajoritarian institution securing the liberties of individuals and political minorities.” 
(quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18)). 
36 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (finding that 
employees of the State of Alabama could not recover monetary damages for to the state’s failure to 
comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 
66-67 (2000) (finding that Florida state employees could not recover monetary damages for the 
state’s failure to comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down a federal act protecting religious freedom as exceeding 
congressional enforcement authority). 
37 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (advancing a separation-of-powers and judicial-competency 
rationale for judicial supremacy over constitutional meaning determinations); see also Robert C. 
Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-
27 (2003) (elaborating on the rationale underlying the Court’s claim of judicial supremacy over 
constitutional meaning determinations in Flores). 
38 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 865 (1999) (construing the judicial-supremacy premise advanced in Flores as based on a 
distinction drawn between constitutional interpretation and ordinary lawmaking). 
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politically independent courts to make decisions about its meaning on the basis 
of reasoned deliberation.39 The only role for the people in constitutional 
meaning determinations, consistent with the Supreme Court’s account of 
judicial supremacy, is through the Article V amendment process, which provides 
a deliberative, super-majoritarian means for changing the Constitution.40 
Popular constitutionalists reject the judicial supremacist account of 
constitutional meaning determination, but there is some variation within 
their theories that brings to light differences in popular constitutionalist 
methodology. In the following, I distinguish between direct and mediated 
forms of popular constitutionalism. 
A. Direct Popular Constitutionalism  
For some popular constitutionalists, whom I label direct popular 
constitutionalists, the problem with judicial supremacy is not the assertion that 
courts have the final say in determining constitutional meaning. Rather, it is 
the insistence that courts determine the meaning of the Constitution to the 
exclusion of direct popular input.41 The basis for this disagreement is both 
descriptive and normative. As a descriptive matter, direct popular 
constitutionalists argue that constitutional meaning determinations often occur 
through dialogue between the people and the courts.42 For example, 
constitutional change sometimes occurs when social movements secure support 
for their rights claims from a broader segment of the people and the people’s 
institutional representatives.43 The Supreme Court, concerned about 
preserving its popular legitimacy while functioning as an unelected and 
unaccountable institution, tethers itself to evolving societal values through 
recognition of those rights claims that secure broader public support. The 
 
39 Id. 
40 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 529 (rejecting congressional assertion of authority over substantive 
constitutional meaning determinations because “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the 
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in 
Article V”). 
41 See Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, supra note 5, at 10 (rejecting the judicial supremacy claim 
that the Constitution is ordinary law that is peculiarly the domain of the court and instead insisting 
the Constitution is popular law “made by the people to bind their governors”). 
42 See Post, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that “the Court . . . commonly constructs constitutional 
law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with culture,” which Post defines as “the beliefs and values 
of nonjudicial actors”). 
43 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 300 (“[I]f judges have played the central role in articulating 
constitutional norms in the American tradition, their understanding of the Constitution has been 
deeply shaped by mobilized citizenry, acting through electoral processes, and outside of them.”). 
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Court then transmits these rights claims through judicial doctrine that shifts 
the meaning of the Constitution.44 
The principal example of such direct popular constitutionalism repeated 
in the literature is the dialogue between the second feminist movement and 
the Court in the 1970s that led to a change in equal protection doctrine as it 
related to sex discrimination.45 The second feminist movement targeted 
barriers to the equality of women found in law, culture, and societal 
expectations.46 Upon reaching adulthood, women were expected to get 
married and take on the role of homemaker.47 Legal regulations denied 
women financial autonomy by giving husbands control over their wives’ 
property and earnings and employment barriers limited many women to jobs 
as secretaries, teachers, and nurses.48 The few women who were able to 
overcome employment barriers and secure opportunities as lawyers, doctors, 
and engineers often faced pay discrimination and denial of opportunities to 
advance in their profession.49 When women became pregnant, they faced 
more discrimination and were often forced out of the workplace.50 
The second feminist movement secured an early, unexpected, victory with 
the addition of sex as a category entitled to protection against employment 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51 In the years 
that immediately followed, the victory proved hollow, as the agency 
responsible for enforcing Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, failed to enforce the law to protect women from discrimination 
in the workplace.52 In the early 1970s, the second feminist movement 
expanded its focus beyond discrimination in the workplace and societal 
expectations about gender roles to claims about female bodily autonomy 
implicated in the abortion debate and societal inaction and insensitivity to 
 
44 See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 419 (“The modern meaning of the Equal Protection Clause 
owes much more to the power and norms of the civil rights and women’s liberation movements than 
to the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers.”). 
45 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 9, at 308-315 (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s sex 
discrimination doctrine and how it was influenced by the second feminist movement). 
46 See NANCY MACLEAN, THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 1945–2000, at 14-20 (2009). 
47 Cf., SHEILA TOBIAS, FACES OF FEMINISM: AN ACTIVIST’S REFLECTIONS ON THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 4-6 (1997) (describing popular understandings of such traditional gender 
roles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the works of writers who questioned those roles). 
48 See id. at 12-13, 44-45 (discussing the limited rights and employment opportunities women 
had in the nineteenth century). 
49 See id. at 95-96 (describing the difficulties women faced in advancing in such positions due 
to the expectation that they devote time to giving birth to and raising children). 
50 See, e.g., id. at 132 (describing how female public school teachers were often forced to resign 
when they became pregnant). 
51 Intended as a “killer” amendment, the addition of sex as a category entitled to protection under 
Title VII was enacted into law under the leadership of a congresswoman from Michigan. See id. at 81-82. 
52 See MACLEAN, supra note 46, at 14. 
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rape.53 The movement sparked congressional passage of the Equal Rights 
Amendment to the Constitution in 1972, nearly fifty years after it was first 
introduced in Congress.54 According to the amendment, “[e]quality of rights 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
state on account of sex.”55 
Although the Equal Rights Amendment came up three states short of the 
38 needed for ratification, the movement secured important gains.56 The 
EEOC increased its aggressiveness in enforcing Title VII prohibitions on sex 
discrimination.57 Congress overruled a Supreme Court decision interpreting 
Title VII to not protect against pregnancy discrimination.58 And perhaps 
most importantly, the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
shifted.59 In the century preceding the second feminist movement, the Court 
first denied women protection from discrimination outright under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.60 When the Court finally did subject a gender 
discriminatory law to equal protection scrutiny, it upheld the law under the 
most deferential form of review.61 In the midst of the second feminist 
movement in the 1970s, a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson 
recognized women as a suspect class, due in part to the fact that women 
suffered a history of discrimination and lacked political power, and subjected 
the law discriminating against women to strict scrutiny.62 In a later decision, 
a majority of the Court settled on a determination that gender was a quasi-
 
53 Id. at 23-26. 
54 See Chronology of the Equal Rights Amendment, 1923–1996, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, 
https://now.org/resource/chronology-of-the-equal-rights-amendment-1923-1996/ [https://perma.cc/
C9C3-MXMG]. 
55 See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42979, THE PROPOSED EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 8 (2018). 
56 See id. at 1. 
57 For example, the EEOC issued a series of guidelines and regulations addressing varying forms 
of employment discrimination on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
Sex, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (2018); Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 
(2018); Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2018). 
58 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)) (overriding Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that a 
pregnancy exclusion from an employer’s disability plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
59 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 7, at 382 (“The Court altered its understanding 
of the Equal Protection Clause even though the Equal Rights Amendment [], which proposed to 
use the procedures of Article V to amend the Constitution to prohibit discrimination based on sex, 
was never ratified.”). 
60 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (upholding a state law denying 
women the right to vote after determining that voting was not a privilege or immunity of 
citizenship); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (upholding a state law denying 
women the opportunity to practice law). 
61 See Goessart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1948) (upholding a gender-discriminatory 
statute using a rational basis form of review). 
62 411 U.S. 677, 685-88 (1973). 
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suspect classification and subjected laws that classified on the basis of gender 
to a lesser, but still rigorous, intermediate form of scrutiny.63 
Supporting the direct popular constitutionalist account is the fact that the 
Court’s new recognition of a constitutional principle of gender equality was not 
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment as originally understood and 
intended.64 Moreover, it is unlikely that the Court would have recognized this 
principle in the absence of the second feminist movement; that the more rights-
protective Warren Court proved unwilling to recognize the constitutional 
principle of gender equality provides some support for this prediction.65 The 
winds of change in societal values, led by a social movement able to garner 
support from the broader population and the people’s representatives, appeared 
to inspire judicial recognition of the right to gender equality. 
B. Mediated Popular Constitutionalism 
Mediated popular constitutionalists suggest that the higher form of 
lawmaking can also be satisfied when Congress and the President make 
constitutional meaning determinations in response to claims by mass social 
movements or widely held societal values.66 The paradigmatic examples of 
mediated popular constitutionalism arising from representative institutional 
engagement with mass social movements are the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 These laws were inspired by the surrounding 
civil rights movement that led to a broader public debate about racial equality 
and the constitutional requirements of equal protection.68 
According to these theorists, popular constitutionalism is not merely a 
description of an important pathway for constitutional change. It is also 
normatively more desirable than the judicial supremacist alternative. 
Constitutional change according to the judicial supremacist account should 
be a judge-only affair. When the text is indeterminate, judges should 
determine constitutional meaning on the basis of their own value judgments 
of how the Constitution should respond to new and evolving societal 
 
63 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). 
64 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights 
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162-64 (1979) (acknowledging that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not understood at the time of the Framing to protect women from discrimination). 
65 See Goessart, 335 U.S. at 465-66 (“[T]hat women may now have achieved the virtues that 
men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, 
does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes . . . .”). 
66 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 266-268 (1991) (describing the mediated 
popular constitutionalism process). 
67 See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 5-7 (2014) (noting that it took the passage of 
these laws to enshrine civil rights as a “fundamental premise of the modern republic”). 
68 See supra note 12. 
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contexts.69 But this judicial supremacist argument runs into a difficult 
question in the context of a democratic republic: why should the values of 
unelected and unaccountable judges decide the meaning of the Constitution 
over the values of the people? Or to state differently, what gives judges the 
authority to impose their values on the people when it is the people who 
ultimately ratified the Constitution? 
For popular constitutionalists, there is no strict separation of law and 
politics in which the Constitution is law and thus the domain of the courts 
and ordinary law is politics and the domain of the people and the people’s 
representatives.70 Instead, the Constitution is the people’s law and cannot be 
separated from politics.71 This inseparability of law and politics does not mean 
that the Constitution’s meaning should be determined and revised according 
to the channels of ordinary majoritarian politics. The Article V amendment 
process suggests that a higher form of politics should be required when 
constitutional revision is the product of deliberation and engagement with 
wide segments of the population. Instead, what mediated popular 
constitutionalists argue is that dialogue between the people, the people’s 
representatives, and the courts satisfies these requirements.72 
Entirely overlooked in both popular constitutionalist accounts is the role 
of agencies. Scholars of administrative constitutionalism have revealed 
through descriptive accounts how agencies are extensively involved in 
constitutional meaning determinations and have developed theoretical 
arguments about the practice.73 I add to the burgeoning theory the argument 
that administrative constitutionalism is a critical component of the popular 
constitutionalist project. In the next Part, I argue that constitutional theorists 
generally, and popular constitutional theorists in particular, have neglected the 
 
69 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL REASONING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 127 (1996) (arguing that “the Constitution requires courts to exercise 
moral judgment,” a task that judges have had to do “since law began”). 
70 See Franklin, supra note 16, at 1074 (“[O]n the popular constitutionalist understanding, many things 
we are used to thinking of as questions of ordinary law or policy turn out to be constitutional questions.”). 
71 See id. (“[P]opular constitutionalism . . . places a heavy responsibility on the people and the 
popular branches of government to develop, articulate, and carry out their own constitutional visions.”). 
72 See, e.g., Post, supra note 11, at 37 (“The articulation of constitutional law thus requires ‘that 
judges . . . participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people as well.’” 
(quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992))). 
73 For historical accounts of administrative constitutionalism, see, for example, Jeremy K. 
Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016); Sophia Z. 
Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 
96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010); Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847 (2018); Karen 
M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the 
Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015). For more doctrinal or theoretical accounts of administrative 
constitutionalism, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative 
Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013); Ross, supra note 24. 
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role of agencies because they typically fail to disaggregate constitutionalism. 
Popular constitutionalists usually address constitutionalism at the level of 
constitutional principal elaboration, while administrative constitutionalism is 
often at the level of constitutional principle application. I show that the 
popular constitutionalists’ fixation on principles comes at a cost in terms of 
understanding not only the role of constitutional applications in shaping 
principles, but also the role of institutions like administrative agencies in the 
project of constitutionalism. In Part III, I argue that administrative agencies 
in their application of constitutional principles serve as critical catalysts for 
popular engagement with constitutional meaning, particularly in this current 
era of political dysfunction and legislative stasis. 
II. DISAGGREGATING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Constitutionalism is not a singular action. Instead, it has three different 
components. The first component involves the interpretation of text. 
Interpretations of text through the use of textualist tools, legislative history, or 
the examination of contemporaneous public meaning rarely yield clear answers 
about the constitutional meaning of the many open-ended constitutional 
provisions that are often at the center of constitutional debates and 
controversies.74 The second and third components, the elaboration of and 
application of constitutional principles, are therefore the primary focal points 
in constitutional meaning determinations involving open-ended constitutional 
text. Constitutional principles “can be understood as the general sense of 
obligation of the constitutional text.”75 Since it is often impossible to pin down 
the specific meaning of open-ended, vague text, those that determine 
constitutional meaning elaborate broader principles derived from sources such 
as “contemporaneous statements of purpose, contemporary social movement 
expressions of values, and Americans’ generalized sense of justice.”76 These 
principles are elaborated at different levels of specificity, but what distinguishes 
them from the third component of constitutionalism—constitutional 
applications—is that they usually do not dictate an outcome in a particular 
dispute about the constitutional permissibility of a state action. Instead, 
principles must be applied. The third component of constitutionalism, 
constitutional applications, “comprise[s] the rules, standards, and evidentiary 
requirements employed to resolve specific constitutional disputes.”77 
 
74 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (2011) (acknowledging that some constitutional texts “are inherently open-ended and 
cannot be understood using only semantic methods”). 
75 Ross, supra note 24, at 540. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 541. 
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A. Direct Popular Constitutionalism 
Popular constitutionalists focus on the elaboration of constitutional 
principles in their advocacy for a popular role in constitutional meaning 
determinations. The social movements that the direct popular 
constitutionalists describe have advanced principles of race and gender 
equality, the individual right to bear arms, and LGBTQ rights, among others. 
Rarely do social movements advocate at the level of specific constitutional 
applications. To the extent that they do, such advocacy has been the near-
exclusive domain of the more elite elements of the movement.78 One 
explanation for social movements’ neglect of constitutional applications is 
that they often lack the salience necessary to attract the popular support and 
media attention to influence elites, elected officials, and ultimately courts. 
Furthermore, to the extent that constitutional applications require deciding 
issues that are sources of latent divisions within a movement, it is politically 
prudent to leave any choice between constitutional applications undecided. 
For example, the second feminist movement pushed a constitutional 
amendment that would have established in the Constitution’s text the 
principle of equal rights for women.79 As a principle, equal rights attracted 
popular support and media attention. Elites rallied around the cry of equal 
rights for women, and the combination of social movement pressure, elite 
support, and media attention contributed to Congress’s decision to pass the 
amendment with the necessary supermajority support.80 A majority of 
Americans supported the ERA from the first time a polling organization 
asked the question in the early 1970s until the struggle for ratification 
officially ended in 1982.81 
The principle of equal rights for women was broad and meant different 
things to different movement supporters. The more liberal activists saw the 
amendment as a tool to bring fundamental changes to gender roles, while the 
more conservative traditionalists saw the amendment as formally recognizing 
equal rights without necessarily upending the status quo.82 According to 
 
78 See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative 
Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 1466-78 (2005) (describing the dominance of social movement and 
interest group elites in the constitutional advocacy surrounding the constitutionality of affirmative 
action in higher education). 
79 See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 8-9 (1996) (discussing the historical 
origins of the Equal Rights Amendment). 
80 See id. at 8-12 (tracing the gradual accumulation of support for the Amendment leading up 
to its passage). 
81 Id. at 14. 
82 See id. at 26 (noting that while some supported the Amendment “only insofar as they [thought] 
it [was] compatible with the status quo,” the Amendment’s more active advocates viewed it as a 
“vehicle for bringing about substantive changes in men’s and women’s lives”). 
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political scientist Jane J. Mansbridge, the implicit strategy of the movement 
supporting the Equal Rights Amendment “was to get people to agree to the 
principle of equal rights, enshrine that principle in the Constitution, and then 
let the Supreme Court decide what this principle actually meant in 
practice.”83 In other words, the constitutional amendment would recognize 
the principle, but the courts would be responsible for applying it. 
Direct popular constitutionalists have more broadly embraced this view 
of constitutionalism. The dialogue between social movements and the courts 
that the direct popular constitutionalists describe are ones in which the rights 
claims are at the general level of principle. Direct popular constitutionalists 
appear willing to concede constitutional applications to the exclusive domain 
of courts. For example, when accounting for the judicial embrace of the 
constitutional principle of equal rights for women, direct popular 
constitutionalists do not differentiate between the Court’s two very different 
judicial applications of the principle. 
In the case of Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court embraced 
the principle of equal rights for women and applied the principle through the 
development of a heightened scrutiny standard to be applied to all laws that 
discriminate against women.84 According to this constitutional application, 
the principle of equal rights for women operates as an anti-subordination 
principle that requires special judicial protection for historically subordinated 
and politically marginalized women against state actor discrimination.85 The 
plurality, however, could not secure the necessary fifth vote, leaving questions 
regarding the application of the principle of equal rights for women open for 
another three years. 
When the Court revisited the constitutional principle in Craig v. Boren, it 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a gender classification that discriminated 
against men.86 The Court did not find that men were a subordinated class 
entitled to special judicial protection. Instead, it determined that gender 
classifications are almost presumptively impermissible because they are often 
based on overbroad generalizations and stereotypes about the way men and 
women are.87 According to Craig, the gender equality principle operates as an 
anti-classification principle that protects men and women from gender 
classifications based on generalizations and stereotypes.88 
 
83 Id. 
84 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). 
85 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1003, 1025-26 (1986) (treating Frontiero as a case recognizing the anti-subordination principle). 
86 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
87 Id. at 198. 
88 See Colker, supra note 85, at 1026 (interpreting Craig as promoting an anti-differentiation 
approach to equal protection). 
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The Court’s choice of an anti-classification standard has important 
implications for the gender equality principle. First, and most obviously, the 
anti-classification standard extended heightened scrutiny to laws that 
discriminated against men, a category of laws to which the second feminist 
movement did not pay much attention. Second, and more importantly, the 
Court’s subsequent application of the anti-classification standard to 
challenges of gender-discriminatory laws revealed a divergence between the 
Court’s approach to equal rights for women and the goals of many of the 
leaders of the second feminist movement. 
A primary goal of the second feminist movement was breaking down 
barriers to women in the workplace and advancing the economic autonomy 
of women.89 Yet when the Court used the anti-classification standard to apply 
the principle of equal rights for women, it resolved cases in a manner directly 
contrary to the movement’s goals. For example, when addressing the 
constitutionality of a state disability law that denied benefits to pregnant 
women, the Court applying the anti-classification standard focused on the 
question of whether the law classified on the basis of sex.90 The Court 
reasoned that it did not since the law discriminated on the basis of pregnancy 
status, not sex.91 If the Court had embraced the Frontiero anti-subordination 
standard in adjudicating claims of gender discrimination, the resolution of 
the controversy would likely have been more consistent with the feminist 
movement’s goals. Since pregnancy discrimination is a tool to subordinate 
women—the only class of individuals who can get pregnant—the disability 
law would have been treated as presumptively unconstitutional because it 
discriminatorily undermined the economic status of women. 
Similarly, in a case addressing the constitutionality of a state hiring 
preference for veterans that shut most women out of most state jobs because 
veterans were overwhelmingly male, the Court, applying the anti-
classification standard, upheld the state action.92 The Court determined that 
despite the disparate impact of the law on a historically subordinated class of 
women, the law did not classify people on the basis of gender because it was 
not motivated by gender discrimination.93 
 
89 See, e.g., Statement of Purpose, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (1996), https://now.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Statement-of-Purpose.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT5G-FFF8] (emphasizing 
the employment disadvantages that women face and promoting an equality of economic opportunity 
for women). 
90 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976). 
91 Id. at 139-40. 
92 Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979). 
93 Id. at 279 (imposing on the female challenger to the disparately impactful state law a 
requirement that she prove that the state adopted the law “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). 
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These two examples show the important function of constitutional 
applications in shaping constitutional principles. The second feminist 
movement’s principle of equal rights for women inspired by the historical 
economic subordination and political marginalization of women was 
transformed, through constitutional application, into a more neutral gender 
non-classification norm. 
B. Mediated Popular Constitutionalism 
The constitutional principles developed through mediated popular 
constitutionalism are usually elaborated at a more detailed level than those 
transmitted through social movements. Constitutional principles advanced 
through the lawmaking process of mediated popular constitutionalism can be 
embedded within comprehensive and intricate statutes, rather than through 
the vague, open-ended language of constitutional amendments, broad rights 
claims, or salient rallying slogans. But even with this additional detail, the 
constitutional meaning determinations advanced in statutes often lack specific 
enough prescriptions to resolve disputes. This lack of specificity arises from 
two primary sources. First is the inability of lawmaking institutions to secure 
agreement on more specific applications of constitutional principles in 
statutes. Legislatures often leave things undecided with the irresolution 
evidenced in the vagueness of a statute.94 Second is the inability of Congress 
to anticipate future contexts in which the statute will apply. An application of 
a constitutional principle for which Congress can secure majority support in 
the present might not be relevant to a context that Congress is unable to 
foresee.95 In these situations of unforeseen contexts, the question of how the 
statute should apply must be resolved in the particular dispute without the 
guidance from the enacting Congress. 
The common link among civil rights statutes enforcing the Equal 
Protection Clause, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is that they embrace the 
antidiscrimination principle.96 But the statutes did not specify how the 
 
94 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in 
the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 550 (1994) (arguing that legislators use vagueness as an essential tool 
to build the necessary support for a statute and avoid opposition from more concentrated interests). 
95 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480 
(1987) (arguing that unanticipated gaps and ambiguities arise in all statutes as society changes “and 
generates new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute”). 
96 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) (“No voting qualification of 
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision [to deny or abridge] the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account 
of race or color . . . .”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) 
(defining unlawful employment actions as the failure or refusal “to hire or to discharge any individual, 
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principle applies. Did the statutes prohibit actions that have a disparate 
impact, or only those actions that are motivated by a discriminatory intent? 
Mediated popular constitutionalists do not contest the Court’s exercise of 
domain over the choice of constitutional application even though that choice 
inevitably shapes the constitutional principle.97 Similar to the gender equality 
context, the choice between a disparate-impact and a discriminatory-intent 
standard is a choice between different visions of anti-discrimination that has 
real world consequences for what equality ultimately means. 
C. Administrative Constitutionalism 
Rich historical accounts of administrative constitutionalism by Sophia 
Lee, Karen Tani, Jeremy Kessler, and Joy Milligan among others illuminate 
administrative agencies’ role in applying constitutional principles.98 In the 
article that gave the practice of administrative constitutionalism its name, Lee 
focuses on instances in which the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and the Federal Power Commission (FPC) creatively expanded and 
narrowed the state action doctrine in their equal employment rulemaking.99 
The constitutional principle of state action that arose from the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s language, “[n]o State 
shall,” limited the amendment’s reach to state actions.100 Left unresolved in 
the judicial elaboration of the constitutional principle was the question: what 
is state action? Over time, the Court developed in case law many, sometimes 
contradictory, applications of the state action principle.101 But what has been 
mostly overlooked in constitutional accounts, and what was revealed in Lee’s 
account, is the role of administrative agencies in developing parallel 
 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
97 For instance, in a case decided soon after the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, the Court 
adopted a standard that would be used to apply the constitutional principle. See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (adopting a disparate-impact standard for Title VII on the basis 
of a finding that “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, 
not simply the motivation” (emphasis in original); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 
(1980) (interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and finding that challengers to an election 
law must prove that the law is motivated by a discriminatory purpose). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(2012) (overturning Bolden and establishing a discriminatory-results test for claims brought under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
98 See generally supra note 73. 
99 Lee, supra note 73, at 810-80 (describing how the FPC and FCC engaged in creative, 
selective, and resistant interpretations of the state action doctrine). 
100 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is 
State action of a particular character that is prohibited [by the Fourteenth Amendment].”). 
101 See Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 575, 581-604 (2016) (describing the doctrinal confusion surrounding the state 
action doctrine). 
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applications of the state action principle that were sometimes at odds with 
those developed in judicial doctrine.102 
Similarly, Karen Tani in her account of administrative equal protection 
demonstrates how the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) was at the forefront in their application of the constitutional 
principle of non-discrimination to recipients of public assistance.103 In its 
evaluation of state welfare laws in the middle part of the twentieth century, 
HEW expansively applied the constitutional nondiscrimination principle 
through rigorous rational review of state welfare provisions—a constitutional 
application that diverged from that of the courts.104 
Finally, Joy Milligan’s examination of the Office of Education uncovers 
an agency engaged in a more constrained application of the constitutional 
principle of racial desegregation than advanced in the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.105 In the wake of the Court’s elaboration of the racial 
desegregation principle in Brown v. Board of Education, the Office of 
Education determined that the principle did not require the denial of federal 
funds to segregated schools in the face of political pressure from civil rights 
groups, the White House, and other agencies.106 
Each of these examples of administrative constitutional applications and 
the many others described by scholars should be considered integral 
components of constitutionalism. Since popular constitutionalists do not 
disaggregate between constitutional principles and constitutional applications, 
this administrative agency role in constitutional meaning determinations has 
been overlooked. 
The popular constitutionalists’ apparent willingness to concede 
constitutional applications to the exclusive domain of courts undermines the 
popular constitutionalist project in an important way. To the extent that 
judicial choice of constitutional application is not responsive to public input, 
the popular influence on constitutional principles is diluted by the ability of 
an unelected and unaccountable court to shape the principles to accord with 
its values through applications. In the next section, I describe the role of an 
institution long ignored by popular constitutionalists—administrative 
agencies—and advance the case that their role in constitutionalism should be 
treated as a critical component of popular constitutional theory. 
 
102 See Lee, supra note 73, at 810-80. 
103 See Tani, supra note 73, at at 844-89. 
104 Id. at 889 (describing the Court’s eventual rejection of HEW’s rigorous review of state 
welfare operations after it had been applied for nearly a half century). 
105 Milligan, supra note 73, at 876-914. 
106 Id. at 901 (“Throughout both administrations, education officials held firmly to the 
position that the Constitution did not empower or require them to prevent federal funds from 
supporting segregation.”). 
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY 
A critique of administrative constitutionalism as a form of popular 
constitutionalism arises from doubts about the popular pedigree of 
administrative agency actions. Administrative agencies do not fit within 
direct popular constitutionalist accounts because agencies are not typically 
seen as focal points for social movement activity. Agencies also do not fit 
within mediated popular constitutionalist accounts because the officials that 
run them are not elected directly by the people. 
While administrative constitutionalism might not have the same type of 
connections to the public as direct and mediated forms of popular 
constitutionalism, there is a range of administrative approaches to applying 
constitutional principles that has varying relationships to the public. 
Administrative applications are advanced through informal guidance letters 
and directives for which career bureaucrats are often principally responsible, 
guidelines that usually incorporate the input of agency heads directly 
accountable to the President, and rules that are the product of agency heads, 
career bureaucrats, and public input through a notice-and-comment process.107 
Administrative applications of constitutional principles through rules that 
are the product of public notice-and-comment have perhaps the strongest 
claims to popular constitutionalism. In the notice-and-comment process, the 
agency is required under the Administrative Procedure Act to give the public 
notice of a proposed rule and an opportunity to submit comments to the 
agency about the proposed rule.108 Public comments range from 
unsophisticated expressions of support, concern, or opposition to the 
proposed rule to more extended examination and recommendations for 
alternatives to the proposed rule.109 Proposed rules adopted as regulations can 
be challenged and held procedurally invalid if the agency fails to consider all 
of the public comments and provide explanations for why it rejected 
alternatives to the proposed rule.110 Administrators must therefore engage in 
 
107 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (2012); see also Robert A. Anthony, 
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use 
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1319-27 (1992) (providing a taxonomy of administrative 
decisionmaking devices). 
108 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
109 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
414 (2005) (finding from an analysis of public comments “dramatic differences . . . in the extent of 
specialized knowledge and technical sophistication reflected in comments from organized interests 
versus those from individual members of the public”). 
110 The courts enforce the mandate of a deliberative notice-and-comment rulemaking process 
through “hard look review” of the process. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring under the arbitrary and capricious standard that the 
“agency . . . examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”); see also Cass R. 
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a deliberative process in which they consider and evaluate comments and 
proposed alternatives, make any necessary adjustments to the rule, and when 
they do revise the rule, resubmit it for additional public comment. 
The notice-and-comment process can involve more direct public input into 
constitutional applications than can participation in social movements, which 
are focused more on principles in dialogue with courts that are then given carte 
blanche discretion to develop constitutional applications on their own. In 
addition, the notice-and-comment process involves at least as much public input 
into constitutional applications as the constitutional meaning determinations 
arising from mediated popular constitutionalism, since representatives tend to 
have little knowledge about the specific preferences of their constituents on most 
issues, even issues of constitutional import.111 Instead, elected representatives 
tend to make decisions on the basis of preferences that they anticipate their 
constituents might have, a much less concrete or direct form of public input than 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.112 
While popular constitutionalists have overlooked this important source of 
popular input into constitutional decisionmaking, the notice-and-comment 
process has its limits. Social science and legal scholars have demonstrated that, 
in most contexts, elites dominate the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, 
with interest groups and other elites submitting the overwhelming majority of 
comments.113 However, it is important to note that the context in which elite 
domination has been shown to be a little less prevalent—the notice-and-
 
Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 287 (1986) 
(describing the goal of hard look review as “guard[ing] against the dangers of self-interested 
representation and of factional tyranny of the regulatory process”). 
111 See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and 
the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 353 (2016) (describing surveys and studies showing that citizens 
lack clear preferences on most policy issues). 
112 Id. at 353-54 (elaborating on the anticipated preference theory, which suggests that 
legislators act on the basis of preferences that they anticipate their constituents have on the basis of 
how they might respond to policy decisions). 
113 See, e.g., William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Process, Accountability, and 
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
66, 70-71 (2004) (finding in an analysis of forty-two rules that “the vast majority of comments come 
from or are orchestrated by organized groups”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias 
Toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006) 
(finding after an examination of forty rules promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Employment Standards Administration and 
the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Railroad Administration and Federal Highway 
Administration that business interests submitted over 57% of the total comments, governmental 
interests submitted 19% of the total comments, and public interest groups provided only 6% of the 
total comments). 
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comment process for rules involving social welfare and civil rights—is the 
context in which many constitutional meaning determinations are made.114 
Such empirical evidence, however, might not be sufficient to ameliorate 
concerns about elite domination of the notice-and-comment process. And 
even if sufficient, there is still the concern that many administrative 
applications of constitutional principles are not made through the notice-and-
comment process, but rather through other decisionmaking processes that 
lack similar channels for direct public input. 
It is thus important to recognize that agency actions applying constitutional 
principles often engage the public in other ways—by triggering the 
involvement of the public, elected officials, institutions, and candidates in a 
debate about constitutional meaning. In a foundational article, Matthew 
McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz famously modeled a rational approach to 
congressional oversight over agency actions that is relevant here.115 According 
to their model, congressional supervision of agency actions occurs through “fire 
alarm” rather than “police patrol” oversight.116 In police patrol oversight, 
“Congress examines a sample of executive agency activities, with the aim of 
detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its 
surveillance, discouraging such violations.”117 For Congressmembers motivated 
by reelection, such police patrol oversight is an irrational waste of time and 
resources. They will “inevitably spend time examining a great many executive-
branch actions that do not violate legislative goals or harm any potential 
supporters [and] detecting and remedying arguable violations that nonetheless 
harm no potential supporters.”118 In addition, since Congressmembers 
“examine only a small sample of executive-branch actions[,] they are likely to 
miss violations that harm their potential supporters.”119 
Such police patrol oversight is more costly to Congress than the 
alternative fire alarm oversight. In employing fire alarm oversight, “Congress 
establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable 
individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative 
decisions . . . to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, 
 
114 See Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? 
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 245, 252-54 (1998) (contrasting 
the complete non-participation of individuals and citizen groups in the comment process for 
Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Transportation Safety Agency rulemaking 
with the broader involvement of citizen advocacy groups and individual citizen participation in 
Department of Housing and Urban Development rulemaking). 
115 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
116 Id. at 165-69. 
117 Id. at 166. 
118 Id. at 168. 
119 Id. 
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and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.”120 This form 
of oversight allows Congress to focus on the agency actions that draw 
attention from the public. Congressmembers will be motivated to supervise, 
oversee, and check these agency actions, particularly when they impact their 
supporters and by extension the congressmembers’ reelection prospects. 
While McCubbins’s and Schwartz’s model focuses on Congress and the 
use of procedures to trigger oversight, administrative applications of 
constitutional principles are likely to trigger fire alarm oversight, since agency 
actions tend to be salient to the public and elicit support from those 
benefitted and opposition from those harmed by the constitutional 
applications. Administrative constitutional applications that trigger fire 
alarms are also likely to trigger reactions from courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court, when the application diverges from that established by 
doctrine. This judicial reaction can open the channels for a dialogic 
relationship between the administrative agency through its action, the public 
through its response, and the Court through its review. 
Administrative law scholarship has explored in depth the notice-and-
comment process and political control (congressional and executive oversight, 
supervision, and direction) pathways of public input into administrative 
decisionmaking. In the next Part, I focus on the third pathway of public input, 
administrative constitutional applications as a catalyst for public input and 
dialogue between courts and agencies. I examine this mechanism of popular 
constitutionalism through an Obama-era example: the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s rule applying a desegregation mandate in 
the Fair Housing Act. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PRACTICE 
In December 2006, the Anti-Discrimination Center of New York (ADC) 
brought a qui tam action on behalf of the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) for damages under the False Claims Act 
against Westchester County, New York.121 The ADC claimed that from 2000–
2009, Westchester County had “knowingly presented . . . to the United States 
false claims to obtain federal funding for housing and community 
development.”122 The ADC’s False Claims Act targeted Westchester County’s 
receipt of federal funding under the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG), which required as a condition for receipt of such funding, that 
 
120 Id. at 166. 
121 See Complaint-in-Intervention of the United States of America, United States ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (No. 06 2860), 2006 WL 6348390. 
122 Id. at 2. 
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Westchester “certify that it met a variety of fair housing obligations, including 
the obligation to affirmatively further fair housing (‘AFFH’).”123 
The “affirmatively further fair housing” obligation originally appeared in 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.124 The Act, which was passed in the wake of 
the assassination of Martin Luther King and the riots that followed in 
African American ghettos and slums throughout the country, had the twin 
goals of banning housing discrimination and addressing residential 
segregation.125 President Lyndon Johnson and members of Congress saw the 
combination of housing discrimination and residential segregation as critical 
contributing factors to the extensive poverty, lack of education, and 
underemployment that plagued African American communities.126 The law 
directly combated housing discrimination through prohibitions on the rental 
and sale of housing and sought to address segregation through a requirement 
that the Secretary of HUD administer the program in a manner that 
affirmatively furthers fair housing.127 
This AFFH mandate embedded within the 1968 Fair Housing Act 
represented an application of the constitutional desegregation principle 
established in Brown v. Board of Education.128 Yet even though Congress built 
into the statute an enforcement regime that gave the administering agency 
(HUD) more power than other agencies responsible for enforcing other civil 
 
123 Id. at 3; see also Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) 
(2012) (requiring recipients of community development block grant funds under the Act to 
“affirmatively further fair housing”); National Affordable Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(15) 
(2012) (requiring recipients of community block grant funds to certify “that the jurisdiction will 
affirmatively further fair housing”). 
124 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012). 
125 See, e.g., David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. 
L. REV. 5, 15 (2017) (describing the context surrounding the adoption of the Fair Housing Act and 
the desegregation and antidiscrimination goals of the Act). 
126 See Lyndon B. Johnson, Message from the President of the United States Proposing 
Enactment of Legislation to Make Authority Against Civil Rights Violence Clear and Sure, H.R. Doc. 
No. 432 (2d. Sess. 1966) [hereinafter Message from the President] (“It is self-evident that the problems 
were are struggling with form a complicated chain of discrimination and lost opportunities.”); see also 
Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection 
on the Fair Housing Act’s Affirmatively Further Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 128-30 (2011) (describing 
congressmembers’ views of the purpose and intended operation of the Fair Housing Act). 
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (establishing the prohibitions on discrimination in the sale or 
rental of housing); id. § 3608(e)(5) (2012) (“The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
shall . . . administer the program and activities relating to housing and urban development in a 
manner affirmatively to further the policies of [fair housing].”). 
128 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (determining that segregation in public schools is a denial of 
equal educational opportunity, which is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause). 
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rights laws,129 the constitutional commitment to housing desegregation 
remained unrealized when the ADC brought its qui tam action against 
Westchester County.130 Moreover, housing segregation, as a matter of 
constitutional or statutory concern, was almost entirely absent from the 
public’s consciousness.131 
In the nearly three years after the ADC brought the action against 
Westchester County, the issue of housing segregation remained mostly 
hidden from public view. The principal source of information to the public, 
the media, paid very little attention to the case. In February 2007, the New 
York Times reported that Westchester County had been sued over a lack of 
affordable housing.132 The article quoted a Princeton University 
demographer, Douglas Massey, who described how little the federal 
government had done in the prior 12–15 years to redress housing 
segregation.133 A week later, the New York Times published an editorial that 
urged greater attention to the ongoing problems of class and ethnic 
segregation in the New York suburbs “where the progress in building new 
units has been meager and largely confined to communities with already 
disproportionately healthy populations of people who are black and Hispanic, 
poor and immigrant.”134 During the litigation between the ADC and 
Westchester County, these were the only two reminders of housing 
segregation’s persistence and government’s failure to satisfy the constitutional 
imperative laid out in Brown v. Board of Education. For the public, housing 
segregation remained a non-issue. 
The catalyst for public engagement with housing segregation came when 
HUD intervened in the case against Westchester County.135 HUD acting 
under President George W. Bush refused to intervene in the ADC’s qui tam 
 
129 See Schwemm, supra note 126, at 144-45 (describing how Congress strengthened the 
Department of Housing and Urban Developments enforcement regime in its amendment to the 
Fair Housing Act in 1988). 
130 See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair 
Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1198 (2011) (describing the persistence of housing segregation 
after the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act). 
131 A ProQuest search of current and historical newspapers found only 25 articles between 1980 
and 2009 that mentioned “affirmatively further fair housing” or “affirmatively furthering fair 
housing” the principal tool for fighting housing segregation. 
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action.136 But after the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
denied Westchester County’s motion to dismiss and then its motion for 
summary judgment,137 HUD acting under President Barack Obama 
intervened at the request of the county that sought to avoid $180 million in 
liability.138 The Department’s intervention resulted in a settlement mandating 
greater residential integration by requiring the County to build 750 affordable 
housing units in mostly white neighborhoods.139 When HUD determined 
that Westchester County was falling short of its settlement obligations, HUD 
took another aggressive step and withheld federal housing funds under the 
Community Development Block Grant.140 
HUD’s actions to enforce what had previously been considered a toothless 
regulation under the AFFH were unprecedented. According to Westchester 
County Executive Andrew Spano, the County’s settlement with HUD 
represented “a ‘sea change in American policy,’ . . . because it guarantee[d] 
access to fair and affordable housing ‘all over,’ as opposed to guaranteeing 
access in certain areas.”141 Fair housing advocates agreed, viewing the 
settlement as a critical and long overdue step to enforcing a law designed to 
eliminate housing segregation.142 
 
136 See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
at 1, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester Cty. 
(S.D.N.Y. April 17, 2007) (No. 06 2860), 2007 WL 1622360, at *1 (noting the government’s decision 
to decline to intervene in the Anti-Discrimination Center’s suit against Westchester County). 
137 See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester 
Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying Westchester County’s motion for 
summary judgment); United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York v. 
Westchester Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying Westchester County’s motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
138 See Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of its Application to 
Intervene in this Action, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. 
Westchester Cty. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009) (No. 06 2860), 2009 WL 2899691; see also Nick Timiraos, 
Wealthy Suburbs Accept Low-Income Homes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB124993778549420475 [https://perma.cc/RYY4-VV3X] (“The settlement with the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban Development ended a $180 
million federal lawsuit brought by the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York . . . over 
Westchester’s responsibility to enforce fair-housing laws.”). 
139 See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester 
Cty., No. 06 2860, 2011 WL 7563042, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011). 
140 See Shelly Banjo, Westchester in HUD Squeeze: Agency Calls Local Officials’ Housing Plans Inadequate, 
WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023042033045764484038
01182500 [https://perma.cc/87GV-6SVY] (describing HUD’s rejection of Westchester County’s 
affordable housing plan and withholding of “$7.3 million in yearly federal housing funds allocated to 
the county”). 
141 See Timiraos, supra note 138. 
142 See, e.g., Craig Gurian, Letter to the Editor, The Court is Right About Westchester County Housing, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020468320457435634043
6871178 [https://perma.cc/T97C-MNDC] (“[T]he settlement both creates real consumer choice and, 
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The unprecedented intervention brought national public attention to 
housing segregation for the first time in decades.143 In the immediate days 
after the settlement, the media targeted the persistent problems of housing 
segregation and the accompanying harms that arose from it. The Wall Street 
Journal interviewed HUD Deputy Secretary Ron Sims, who pointed to the 
lawsuit as evidence of the “‘significant amount of racial segregation’ in 
Westchester” and described studies showing that “zip codes could 
increasingly serve as a predictor of life expectancy and illness.”144 Sims 
concluded with an appeal “to remove zip codes as a factor in the quality of 
life in America.”145 The New York Times quoted Craig Gurian, executive 
director of the Anti-Discrimination Center, who followed in the path of 
President Lyndon Johnson by drawing the link between housing segregation 
and other forms of racial disadvantage. “Residential segregation,” Gurian 
explained, “underlies virtually every racial disparity in America, from 
education to jobs to the delivery of health care.”146 
In the years following HUD’s intervention, the public through the media 
engaged in dialogue about the history of housing segregation. Newspaper 
articles reminded people of the degree of racial residential segregation and 
how we got here. Articles described federal and state governments’ social 
engineering of segregation through their enforcement of racial restrictive 
covenants, neighborhood redlining practices, and the siting and segregation 
 
41 years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, takes an important step toward ending the legacy 
of ‘two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal.’”). 
143 In contrast to the 25 newspaper articles found in a ProQuest search of current and historical 
newspapers between 1980 and 2009 that mentioned the principal tool for fighting housing 
segregation, “affirmatively further fair housing” or “affirmatively furthering fair housing,” using 
those same search terms yielded 132 articles between 2009 and the present. 
144 Timiraos, supra note 135. 
145 Id. In a follow up Wall Street Journal blog after the Westchester County settlement with 
HUD, journalist Nick Timiraos asked his readers the following questions: “[H]ow diverse are your 
communities? Do you think your communities could face similar scrutiny?” Nick Timiraos, Westchester 
Settlement: “Removing ZIP Code as Quality of Life Factor”, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2009), https://
blogs.wsj.com/developments/2009/08/11/westchester-settlement-removing-zip-code-as-quality-of-life-
factor/ [https://perma.cc/2M3N-ABY4]. In an answer to the questions, a blog poster expressed 
opposition to the HUD Deputy Secretary’s idea of removing zip codes as a factor in the quality of 
life in America. The blog poster argued that “[t]aken to its logical conclusion, this idea would 
eliminate any income or housing quality distinction between different parts of town.” That means, 
according to the blog post, “[i]t would eliminate the distinctions in culture that brought those who 
live in a more expensive part of town to where they’re at . . . [and it] would eliminate the incentive 
to work towards upward social mobility.” Don Warrington, Removing Zip Code as a Quality of Life 
Factor, POSITIVE INFINITY (Nov. 6, 2009), https://www.vulcanhammer.org/2009/11/06/removing-
zip-code-as-a-quality-of-life-factor/ [https://perma.cc/U8GR-2FLC]. 
146 Sam Roberts, Westchester Adds Housing to Desegregation Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/nyregion/11settle.html [https://perma.cc/3BTK-J82B]. 
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of public housing, among other discriminatory practices.147 Media accounts 
recalled for the public the history and purpose of the Fair Housing Act. 
Articles recounted how the findings from the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders, also known as the Kerner Commission, inspired the Fair 
Housing Act.148 The Kerner Commission attributed the riots and unrest in 
major cities during the 1960s to residential segregation “sustained and made 
worse by federal policies that concentrated poor black citizens in ghettoes” 
with little or no educational or employment opportunities.149 The report 
warned in a famous passage that newspapers picked up again after HUD’s 
intervention into the Westchester County litigation that “[o]ur Nation is 
moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”150 
Media outlets recognized the rooting out of residential segregation as a 
purpose of the Fair Housing Act.151 They informed the public about the Act’s 
failure due in part to executive under-enforcement of the Fair Housing Act 
mandates.152 The combined effect of multiple Presidents’ lack of political will 
 
147 See, e.g., Daniel Denvir, Separation Anxiety, PHILA. WEEKLY, March 16, 2011, at 10-12 (showing 
that black, Latino, and Asian people continue to be segregated from white people as they move into the 
suburbs); Jane Smith, What Exactly is “Fair Housing?”, RECORDER, April 4, 2014, at A.6. 
148 See, e.g., Editorial Board, Housing Apartheid, American Style, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/opinion/sunday/housing-apartheid-american-style.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SH7-LX6P] (describing the findings of the Kerner Commission); see also Troutt, 
supra note 125, at 22 (“[T]he Kerner Commission Report was especially influential in crafting the Fair 
Housing Act . . . .”). 
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and opposition to the anti-discrimination and desegregation goals of the Act, 
newspapers noted, contributed to this weak enforcement of the Act.153 
Descriptions of the history of housing segregation and the Fair Housing Act 
led to thick, empirically driven media accounts of the persistence of such 
segregation. Mainstream media outlets covered studies of housing segregation 
once left to the annals of academic journals.154 Reports about the index of 
dissimilarity, a measure of residential segregation, identified the degree of 
segregation throughout the country and shifts in segregation patterns, from the 
“white flight” to the suburbs of the past to the gentrification of city 
neighborhoods in the present.155 Newspapers reported on studies about the 
relationship between segregation and other forms of racial disadvantage, such as 
education and employment disparities and differences in exposure to crime.156 
The most important connection drawn from the perspective of 
constitutionalism was that between the segregation of housing and schools 
and the concomitant differences in educational opportunity and outcomes. 
What was old and broadly known in the 1960s became new and more widely 
shared after HUD intervened in 2009. In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson 
submitted a message to Congress proposing the enactment of a precursor to 
what became the Fair Housing Act that described the “complicated chain of 
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discrimination and lost opportunities.”157 As President Johnson explained, 
“[e]mployment is often dependent on education, education on neighborhood 
schools and housing, housing on income, and income on employment. . . . All 
the links—poverty, lack of education, underemployment, and now 
discrimination in housing—must be attacked together.”158 For forty years 
after Johnson’s speech, the public mostly ignored the role of housing 
discrimination in the chain of discrimination and lost opportunity, until the 
issue returned to the forefront of the public debate after HUD’s intervention. 
Mirroring the views of President Johnson, ADC Executive Director Craig 
Gurian explained that “[r]esidential segregation underlies virtually every 
racial disparity in America, from education to jobs to the delivery of health 
care.”159 In a letter to the editor, a former HUD Administrator praised the 
New York Times for placing “housing segregation and racism at the heart of 
our urban problem” and then reaffirmed that “[i]t’s about everything that goes 
with [housing segregation and discrimination]: joblessness, crime, drugs, 
underperforming schools, crumbling infrastructure, inadequate public 
services—the list goes on.”160 
As with all public dialogues at the center of popular constitutional 
debates, there were opponents who took a differing view of housing 
segregation and HUD’s response to it, a perspective that also played out in 
the media. While supporters of HUD’s intervention linked persistent 
housing segregation to past discriminatory state actions, those opposed to 
federal involvement argued that segregation was a product of choice and 
income. An anonymous editorial in the Wall Street Journal written days after 
HUD’s intervention into the action against Westchester County challenged 
the assumption that the low presence of racial and ethnic minorities in certain 
Westchester towns was the result of discrimination. The author noted that 
“there’s no pattern of fair housing complaints or other evidence showing that 
black families with incomes similar to whites in more upscale neighborhoods 
were barred from those jurisdictions.”161 The integration of black and Latinos 
into suburban Westchester towns was increasing, the editorial argued, “as the 
household incomes of those groups rise.”162 Another Wall Street Journal 
article titled “HUD’s Racial Agenda” quoted statements from conservative 
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members of the United States Commission of Civil Rights, who asserted that 
“legal segregation has been dead for over forty years” and that “geographic 
clustering of racial and ethnic groups is not in and of itself an invidious 
phenomenon.”163 The article then editorialized that “if Asian or black or white 
communities voluntarily choose to live together, that’s perfectly legal.”164 A 
later Wall Street Journal article cited unnamed “research” showing that “for 
decades large majorities of blacks have no desire to live in all-white or even 
mostly white neighborhoods and strongly prefer to live where at least half of 
the other residents are black” as an argument against “the federal government 
. . . forcing wealthy Westchester municipalities to import low-income 
minorities.”165 
The opponents of HUD’s actions accused the agency of engaging in social 
engineering. A New York Times editorial in 2012 quoted a Republican 
candidate for a United States Senate seat in New York, who accused President 
Obama and HUD of “trying to ‘socially engineer’ rich communities into 
accepting poorer people.”166 A Washington Post editorial titled “Obama 
Wants to Reengineer Your Neighborhood” accused HUD of using the 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing mandate to “force communities to 
diversify.”167 Such forced integration, another critic argued, would create or 
heighten racial tensions.168 
A final criticism pitted HUD’s federal anti-segregation efforts against the 
principle of local control. Robert Astorino, the Westchester County executive 
responsible for implementing the HUD settlement, tried to rally opponents 
through the use of federalism-infused arguments. A media outlet quoted 
Astorino as claiming that “Washington bureaucrats, who you will never see 
or meet, want the power to determine who will live where and how each 
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neighborhood will look.”169 For Astorino, “[w]hat’s at stake is the fundamental 
right of our cities, towns, and villages to plan and zone for themselves.”170 In 
a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Astorino tried to stoke longstanding fears about 
centralized housing by suggesting to the reader that HUD was seeking 
“unchecked power to put an apartment building in your neighborhood.”171 
Then, combining arguments about federal control and social engineering, 
Astorino went on to assert that HUD “wants the power to dismantle local 
zoning so communities have what it considers the right mix of economic, 
racial and ethnic diversity.”172 Letters to the editor and other editorials in the 
Wall Street Journal agreed with Astorino’s characterization of HUD’s efforts 
to address housing segregation as an assault on local control.173 
In the midst of this public dialogue about the history and persistence of 
housing segregation and the public debate about its sources and effects, HUD 
proposed and adopted a rule to enforce the Fair Housing Act’s Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair housing mandate.174 The Supreme Court also reaffirmed the 
desegregation purposes of the Act.175 The relationship between the public 
dialogue and debate, the HUD rule, and the Supreme Court’s decision is 
impossible to prove definitively. But the correlation between the public 
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dialogue and debate, the adoption of the first HUD rule to enforce the 
AFFH, and the conservative Supreme Court’s surprising decision to embrace 
HUD’s disparate-impact standard of liability for housing discrimination to 
support the goal of desegregation is noteworthy. 
Although the HUD rule imposed extremely modest requirements on 
recipients of federal housing funding, it served as a catalyst for further public 
debate. Supporters saw the rule as a first step toward more robust 
enforcement of the AFFH desegregation mandate.176 Opponents viewed it as 
more social engineering and a further assault on local control.177 For the first 
time in decades, HUD’s rule drew attention to housing segregation in a 
presidential contest. A day after HUD issued its rule, Republican presidential 
candidate Ben Carson described HUD-enforced housing desegregation as a 
form of social engineering.178 A few months later, the Republican Party joined 
in the backlash against the rule. The GOP in its 2016 platform accused the 
Obama administration of “trying to seize control of the zoning process 
through its Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing regulation” and 
“threaten[ing] to undermine zoning laws in order to socially engineer every 
community in the country.”179 The Democratic Party platform responded 
with a promise to “defend[] and strengthen[] the Fair Housing Act.”180 
Donald Trump’s subsequent election as president opened the door to a 
rollback of HUD’s desegregation efforts during the Obama administration. 
The rollback started with the appointment of Ben Carson to serve as secretary 
of HUD,181 and culminated with the suspension of the HUD rule enforcing 
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AFFH and the shift away from integration as a goal for housing policy.182 In 
some respects, the rollback has left us back where we began when HUD 
intervened in the Westchester County litigation. Prior to the intervention, 
HUD had done little to enforce the Fair Housing Act’s desegregation 
mandate, and in the current context the Trump administration seems 
interested in reducing the federal role in advancing housing integration.183 
But in one critical respect, the public discourse pre-Westchester County looks 
very different from that of today. Prior to HUD’s intervention into 
Westchester County, there was very little public attention and virtually no 
public dialogue about housing desegregation, an issue of enormous 
constitutional import that has not been adequately addressed. The HUD 
intervention into Westchester County inspired a popular constitutional 
debate, with advancement in constitutional rights claims and backlash against 
them that are typical of most popular constitutional rights movements. This 
popular debate has not yet concluded, but without an administrative agency 
as the catalyst, it likely would have never begun. 
CONCLUSION 
As a descriptive project, the current accounts of popular constitutionalism 
are incomplete. Popular constitutional theorists provide a persuasive account 
for constitutionalism in the first century and a half of the American republic, 
when frequent popular movements, congressional and presidential 
interventions into constitutional disputes, and state advancement of, and 
resistance to, constitutional values all effectively competed with courts as 
focal points for constitutional interpretive disputes.184 But for most of the 
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past century, constitutional change has far outpaced the efforts of these 
popular actors and institutions. A popular constitutionalism for the modern 
era requires a recognition of both the role of agencies as constitutional actors, 
as loci for popular input in constitutional meaning determinations, and as 
catalysts for popular debate about the Constitution. In fact, in a context in 
which social movement activity is infrequent, Congress is dysfunctional, and 
the President for the most part stays out of constitutional disputes, 
administrative agencies are arguably the lead popular constitutional actors 
that compete with the constitutional supremacy of the courts. 
It is the hope that this Article will serve as a starting point for 
understanding administrative agencies’ roles as popular constitutional actors. 
The role of HUD as a catalyst for a popular constitutional debate on the 
government’s mandate to combat the constitutional harm of segregation is just 
one of many examples from the recent era. Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
attack on Voter ID laws, which served as a catalyst for popular debate about 
the constitutional right to vote, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Clean Power Plan that triggered a popular debate about separation of powers 
and executive authority, are both other very recent examples of such actions 
by administrative agencies that are ripe for further examination.185 Once we 
account for the role of administrative agencies in popular constitutionalism, 
we can also more completely re-engage the normative debate about who 
should exercise control over the meaning of the Constitution. 
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